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Jagged Edges
Modern adverse possession doctrine appears to be in regular need of re-
justification. There are now alternative methods of addressing innocent
improvements or title defects, as well as increasingly robust and reliable
recording systems. To the layperson, adverse possession appears to be
legalizing theft. In this ongoing debate, a great deal of ink has been spilled
justifying or criticizing adverse possession, particularly on the basis of its
economic efficiency. This Comment provides a new lens for viewing the
efficiency of adverse possession by examining the tendency for successful
claims to reshape the regularity of boundary lines. As this Comment attempts
to demonstrate, the short- and long-term economic effects of boundary
irregularity raise significant questions regarding the suitability of adverse
possession doctrine to contemporary needs, particularly for certain
topographies. Moving forward, adverse possession doctrine may be able to
incorporate considerations of these irregularity effects in order to improve
efficiency at both a parcel-by-parcel and a community-wide level.
Part I outlines the predominant efficiency justifications for adverse
possession and critiques of these justifications. Part II describes the effects of
adverse possession on boundary regularity and the effects of boundary
regularity, in turn, on land values, transaction costs, and long-term economic
trends. Part III examines adverse possession doctrine and statutes, finding no
evidence that courts currently take these concerns about boundary irregularity
into account but identifying potential footholds for them to do so. Finally, Part
IV notes how the effects of boundary irregularity differ across topographies in
a way that may lend further explanatory power to the evolution of states'
divergent adverse possession laws.
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I. ADVERSE POSSESSION AND NOTED TENSIONS WITH EFFICIENCY
One of the primary and longstanding justifications for the adverse
possession doctrine is that it increases economic efficiency. Adverse possession,
it is argued, results in higher-valued uses for individual parcels of land.' Some
scholars have further claimed that adverse possession reduces transaction costs
for the property market as a whole.'
In response, other legal scholars have criticized adverse possession as
inefficient on numerous grounds. First, it is claimed, if the purpose of adverse
possession were to transfer titles to higher-valued uses, then use of a liability
rule rather than a property rule would be far better at ensuring that adverse
possession claims succeed only when the adverse possessor's value actually
exceeds that of the original owner.' Second, with robust, reliable modern title
recording systems, adverse possession's ability to clear aside stale or
questionable claims is considered less useful.' In fact, potential adverse
possession claims may actually "mak[e] the record less reliable . . . .
decreas[ing] the certainty" of ownership.' Third, requirements of good faith
intent in adverse possession, as found in some states, arguably block efficient
adverse possessors who are aware they are squatting while rewarding innocent
but inefficient ones. 6 Finally, it has been pointed out that the focus on higher-
1. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 154 (6th ed. 2012) ("The
economic advantage of adverse possession is that it... allows property to move to higher-
valuing users."); 16 RIcHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. RoHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
§ 91.014] (Michael Allan Wolf ed. 2014) (suggesting that "efficient allocation of our limited
land resources" is one of the policies served by adverse possession); Paula R. Latovick,
Adverse Possession Against the States: The Hornbooks Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
939, 941 (1996).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property,
64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 678 (1986) (arguing that adverse possession reduces "title-clearing
costs" as well as the costs of actual litigation by "induc[ing] individuals to bring suit early");
Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L. REv.
1122, 1129-30 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Noel Elfant, Comment, Compensation for the Involuntary Transfer of Property Between
Private Parties: Application of a Liability Rule to the Law of Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L.
REv. 758, 761-62 (1984).
4. See Kristine S. Cherek, From Trespasser to Homeowner: The Case Against Adverse Possession in
the Post-Crash World, 20 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 271, 285 (2012) ("Given the absence of an
effective system for recording title to real property in the post-feudal period, society relied
on long-term possession as sufficient evidence of ownership. In contrast, today we have
long-established systems for the recording of title to real property.").
5. Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case forAdverse Possession, 89 GEo. L.J. 2419, 2442 (20o0).
6. Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession, loo Nw. U.
L. REv. 1037, io68 (2006) ("Slicing the universe of encroachments along the dimension of
ignorance does not.., separate efficient encroachments from those that are inefficient.").
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valued uses fails to take into account non-use utility, potentially undermining
both environmental quality and broader social efficiency.
7
This Comment seeks to contribute to the ongoing analysis of adverse
possession's efficiency. It examines how successful adverse possession claims,
by redrawing the shape of property boundaries, can sometimes reduce market
value, generate subsequent transaction costs, and cause larger systemic
distortions. These findings further undermine the aforementioned
characterization of adverse possession as efficiency-promoting. The fact that
existing adverse possession doctrine does not take boundary regularity into
account greatly reduces adverse possession's efficiency. Courts and legislatures,
however, can potentially make adverse possession doctrine more efficient by
incorporating boundary regularity into the doctrine.
II. THE EFFECTS OF ADVERSE POSSESSION ON EFFICIENCY DUE TO
BOUNDARY IRREGULARITY
A. Adverse Possession Affects Boundary Irregularity
The requirement that adverse possession be actual'- defined as a person's
"having or holding [the] property in one's power" and "exercis[ing] . . .
dominion over" it9 - frequently results in pieces of land being carved out of the
original owner's parcel rather than the transfer of the entire parcel. An adverse
possessor might have actual possession of only a certain portion, such as a
fenced-in area adjacent to the property line" or a campsite gradually
constructed in an uncultivated area,1' leaving the remainder to the original
owner. As a result, adverse possession has the potential to make property
boundaries more or less regular in different disputes. For example, one adverse
possession might act to "complete the square," as it were, increasing regularity:
7. See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REv.
816 (1994).
8. See infra note 26 and accompanying text (identifying state statutes that list typical adverse
possession requirements in more detail, including the requirement of actual possession).
9. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1281 (9 th ed. 2009) (defining "possession"). For a prototypical
example of this principle in practice, see Eime v. Bradford, 18S S.W.3d 233, 236 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2oo6), which notes that "[a] ctual possession is the present ability to control the land."
lo. See, e.g., Cagle v. Hammond, 57 So. 3 d 15o, 152 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010).
ii. Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d 304, 307 (Alaska 199o).
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White adversely possesses Gray from Black, resulting in two rectangular parcels.
Another adverse possession might cleave off a bizarre shape from an otherwise
rectangular parcel, decreasing regularity:
White adversely possesses Gray from Black, resulting in two non-rectangular parcels.
Finally, particularly in claims of constructive possession, where an occupier
with color of title can adversely possess the entire parcel referred to in the
title,12 an adverse possession may neither increase nor decrease regularity:
12. Some states allow an adverse possessor with color of title to claim constructive possession of
the entire parcel referred to in the title, even if actual possession only took place on a small
portion. See, e.g., Skelly v. Brucher, No. CVo840 334 59 S, 2011 WL 522788, at *4 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 2011) ("Where there is color of title... actual and exclusive occupation of
any part of the deeded premises carrie[s] with it constructive possession of the whole.")
(quoting Cmty. Feed Store v. Ne. Culvert Corp., 559 A.2d 1o68, 1070 (Vt. 1989)); Duplantis
v. Bergeron, No. 2010 CA 2244, 2011 WL 4613014, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2011)
("[P]Iaintiffs must only show that they ... possessed a part of the land for some period in
order to avail themselves of the benefit of constructive possession over all of the land within
the limits of their title."); Beck v. Beck, 648 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ("However, a
disseisor who enters under 'color of title' and demonstrates actual possession . . . of a
portion of property described in the invalid instrument, may thereby establish constructive
possession of [the] entire tract described therein."); Foust v. Metcalf, 338 S.W.3d 457, 465(Tenn. Ct. App. 2010)) ("When a party holds some portion of land in actual adverse
possession, and that possession is under color of title, 'the party so holding has constructive
possession of all the premises outside of his inclosure to the limits of his claim or assurance
of title.'") (quoting Green v. Cumberland Coal & Coke Co., 72S.W. 459,460 (Tenn. 1903)).
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White adversely possesses the entirety of Gray, leaving the eastern irregular border
unchanged.
Consequently, adverse possession has the potential to alter the general level
of regularity in land boundaries with every dispute. In the long run, adverse
possession may contribute to a general trend toward or away from regularity.
As outlined in the next section, the relative regularity of parcel boundaries has
direct effects on land value, transaction costs, and property dispute frequency.
B. Boundaty Irregularity May Decrease the Value of Land, Increase Transaction
Costs, and Cause Long-Term Distortions
Boundary regularity can directly impact land values and transaction costs.
Using a natural experiment in central Ohio-where land demarcated by metes
and bounds like rivers and trees is interspersed with land demarcated by
standardized rectangular borders - economists Gary Libecap and Dean Lueck
demonstrate that per-acre land values are higher with regular, straight-line
boundaries. 3 Parcels of land demarcated under this rectangular system also
undergo fewer property disputes and more market transactions.' 4 Hence, even
if dividing a parcel in two has certain efficiency gains-say, by allowing one
owner to use a riparian section for water access and another owner to use a
forested section for logging when neither has the capital alone to do both -
these gains may be completely offset by the net reduction in land value and
increased transaction costs if the division occurs in an irregular fashion.
13. Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coordinating Property
Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426, 428 (2011) (finding the value of rectangular parcels to be
as much as twenty to thirty percent higher than irregularly shaped parcels in the areas they
examined).
14. Id.
15. For other typically claimed efficiency gains, see supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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1. Boundary Irregularity May Decrease Land Values
Applying Libecap and Lueck's results to the case of adverse possession, the
effects of boundary irregularity are twofold. First, an adverse possessor may no
longer value the disputed section of property more than the original owner
does if carving out the disputed section with irregular borders reduces its
market value. Second, the new irregular borders can also reduce the value of
the original owner's remaining parcel. A numerical example lends some insight
into how even a relatively small percentage decrease in value associated with
border irregularity can result in a large total loss when experienced by both
parties.
Consider the following example: original Owner (00) owns the heavily
forested parcel of land A, which includes a small clearing in its southwestern
portion. Adverse Possessor (AP) has been in actual possession of this clearing
for the requisite statutory period. A court transferring title of the clearing to AP
may draw the boundaries in two ways: First, the actual jagged tree line
surrounding the clearing may be followed, resulting in the highly irregular
parcel B. Second, a parcel of equal area may be created by using straight lines




Two different methods of dividing up parcel A.
00 values the whole of A at $1oo, and A-B at $8o. While A-B and A-B'
have the same acreage, A-B' does not suffer from an irregular southwestern
border and hence has higher market value, resulting in a higher ultimate
valuation from 00 of $90.,6 Meanwhile, AP values the clearing parcel B at
$20. Again, while B has the same acreage and location as B', B' does not suffer
from irregular borders, so AP's ultimate valuation of B' is higher, at $30.
16. Note that this 12.5 percent increase in value is actually conservative compared to the results
of Libecap and Lueck. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 13, at 428.
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Hence, if the court grants B to AP, the result would be $20 + $8o = $1oo total
in value. If the court grants B' to AP, the result would be $30 + $90 = $120
total in value. The latter scenario, in addition to being more efficient than the
former, is also a Pareto improvement, making both parties better off than the
alternative. As outlined in later sections, the latter scenario also features
reduced transaction costs for resale down the line, promoting systemic
efficiency.
As this example demonstrates, dividing parcels along irregular boundaries
can lead to relatively dramatic efficiency losses, even when using conservative
estimates of the premium placed on parcels with rectangular borders. The
example also shows that if adverse possession occurs, both the adverse
possessor and the original owner might prefer that a rectangular section be
carved out rather than an irregular one.
One might object that Coasian bargaining could mitigate any court
decision that inefficiently carves out an irregular parcel. Since both parties
would be better off with a regular parcel, they could renegotiate the property
lines. But the fact that litigation for adverse possession has occurred-rather
than the adverse possessor simply having bargained for the property with the
true owner in the first place-already implies the existence of some sort of
barrier preventing the parties from transacting, especially in those cases where
the property was not possessed in good faith." Either way, two neighbors-
turned-adversaries, fresh out of contentious litigation, seem unlikely to
entertain mutually beneficial bargaining. As a result, if these efficiency gains
from carving out regular parcels rather than irregular ones are to be captured, it
would largely be up to the courts to do it. However, as outlined in Part III, the
doctrine of adverse possession is at best indifferent to these efficiency
considerations, and more likely hostile to them.
2. Boundary Irregularity Increases Transaction Costs and Causes Long-
Term Distortions
Libecap and Lueck's study also found that irregular boundaries led to more
property disputes and fewer market transactions. 8 This finding is troubling on
its face for those who believe that adverse possession promotes efficiency, since
17. For example, the so-called Maine rule effectively privileges bad faith in adverse possession:
an intent to claim land that one does not own. See Preble v. Maine Cent. R.R. Co., 27 A. 149,
iSo (Me. 1893). The rule has since been eliminated in Maine itself, via ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 81o-A (2009), but can still be found in certain jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fulkerson v.
Van Buren, 961 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998); Perry v. Heirs of Gadsden, 449
S.E.2d 250, 251 (S.C. 1994) (per curiam); Ellis v. Jansing, 620 S.W.2d 569, 571-72 (Tex.
1981).
18. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 13, at 428.
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transaction costs are demonstrably increased overall. Whatever decreases in
title-clearing and litigation costs are associated with adverse possession, '9 they
clearly can be offset by the costs of increased irregularity, at least in the
aggregate.
Furthermore, there are two additional costs of irregularity not incorporated
into Libecap and Lueck's analysis. First, the best uses of land will vary over
time. The potential to engage in fracking (hydraulically fracturing shale for
natural gas), for example, was at one time unknown and technologically
impossible, but now may efficiently supplant farming along river basins or
surface mining in Appalachia.2' Adverse possession makes it costlier for future
uses to take root by breaking up land into highly irregular shapes that are
suitable primarily for a particularized contemporary use. A parcel that has been
shaped for a narrow, specialized range of uses is more likely to need
reshaping - and hence further negotiation with neighboring owners - to adapt
to other uses in the future. To some extent, this concern with the shape of
properties overlaps with longstanding concerns regarding property
fragmentation: it is simply more difficult to negotiate with more owners across
more parcels, all else being equal.' Additionally, as noted earlier, someone
looking to reshape those property boundaries to reflect contemporary uses will
face costlier and less reliable surveys as a result of the earlier adverse
possession, as well as a greater risk for property disputes. In this way, adverse
possession not only makes ownership more uncertain' but also freezes land
boundaries and sales.
Second, when irregular boundaries proliferate, coordination for
infrastructure investment can become more difficult. In order to avoid cleaving
someone's parcel of land in two, those seeking to build roads, rails, or pipelines
must follow longer, twisting paths rather than straight lines. This increases
costs; for example, with roads, winding paths mean longer, less efficient routes
with lower speed limits as well as increased crashes and fatalities. 3 With
ig. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
ao. Cf. Today in Energy: North America Leads the World in Production of Shale Gas,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm
?id=1 34 9 1 [http://perma.cc/M9WU-U5X9]; Zhongmin Wang & Alan Krupnick, A
Retrospective Review of Shale Gas Development in the United States, RESOURCES FOR THE
FuTURE lo (Apr. 2013), http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/RFF-DP-13-12.pdf [http://
perma.cc/CD7E-RM4G].
21. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and
Anticommons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (2000); Norbert Schulz et al., Fragmentation in Property:
Towards a General Model, 158 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 605-o6 (2002).
22. See Stake, supra note 5, at 2439.




railways, minimum railway curve radii and transition curves completely forbid
paths that zigzag too sharply or frequendy 4 Transportation routes are an
obvious example, but any infrastructure project that potentially crosses
multiple property lines-parks, man-made waterways, utilities-would be
stymied when those lines are complex. Eminent domain powers may help, but
the availability of those powers for a given project may vary based on state law,
local government delegation, or political viability. Even when eminent domain
is available, the taxpayer cost of potentially numerous, idiosyncratic valuation
trials for projects that are forced to go through parcels' would still be much
higher than the cost of obtaining easements along the edges of fewer,
rectangular parcels. In this way, adverse possession's net impact on boundary
irregularity has the potential to make investments in infrastructure increasingly
costly, with deleterious impacts on long-term economic growth.
III. BOUNDARY CONCERNS HAVE NO PLACE IN MODERN ADVERSE
POSSESSION DOCTRINE, BUT COULD WITH MINOR CHANGES
The current legal doctrine of adverse possession ignores any change in
value that results from dividing parcels into either irregular or regular shapes.
Typically, adverse possession statutes require only that the possession be
continuous, actual, adverse, open and notorious, and exclusive for a specified
length of time.26 These statutes do not explicitly mention any potential changes
.cc/952R-MT9N] (noting the need for reduced speed around curves as well as the
disproportionate number of crashes that occur on horizontal curves).
24. See Am. Ry. Eng'g & Maint.-of-Way Ass'n, Railway Track Design, in PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO RAILWAY ENGINEERING 224 (2003), https://www.arema.org/eseries/scriptcontent
/custom/e_arema/PracticalGuide/PGChapter6.pdf [http://perma.cc/FP6P-J3CC]; Transit
Coop. Research Program, Track Design Handbook for Light Rail Transit, FED. TRANsIT
ADMIN. 3-13 (2012), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp-rpt_155.pdf [http://
perma.cc/6ZBJ-LSQ6] (noting minimum railway curve limits as well as increased costs
associated with track curvature).
25. For evidence of the value lost in disrupting parcel contiguity itself, consider the
longstanding legal principle of plottage -"the increment of value which accrues to two or
more [contiguous] lots in single ownership by virtue of their consequent adaptability for
greater use"- as well as the high transaction costs associated with parcel re-assembly due to
holdout effects. BALLAN'iNE'S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (3d ed. 1969); see also Vitauts M.
Gulbis, Assemblage or Plottage as Factor Affecting Value in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 8
A.L.R. 4 th 1202 (1981) (noting that "courts have accepted plottage as an element of value"
where "there is unity of ownership over the lots, and the lots are contiguous and adaptable
to integrated use"); Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Land Assembly and the Holdout
Problem Under Sequential Bargaining, 14 AM. L. ECON. REV. 372 (2012).
26. For prototypical examples, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-ii-io6 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. S 44-5-
161 (2010); and N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-22 (2004). Some states have the additional
requirement that improvements be made to the disputed land by the adverse possessor. See
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in value to the land as a factor in determining whether adverse possession has
successfully occurred. Nor have the courts interpreted the typical checklist of
requirements for an adverse possession claim in such a way as to incorporate
potential loss in value. Rather, the actual value of the disputed land comes into
play only when calculating damages after adverse possession fails' or, in states
that allow adverse possession only when the adverse possessor has made
sufficient improvements to the land, when determining the extent of
improvements made.' As a result, the relative value of the land in one piece,
multiple irregular pieces, or multiple regular pieces is given no consideration.
Judges, however, could use the improvement requirement as a foothold for
incorporating border irregularity concerns. They could calculate the extent of
improvements by comparing the value of the disputed land cleaved from the
larger parcel (along with any new additions) to the drop in value of the
remaining parcel. If judges were to allow adverse possession only when the
former outweighs the latter, then any change of value due to increased
irregularity would be implicitly taken into consideration.
Most courts are already in the habit of considering the changes in value
associated with breaking up parcels into different pieces. In particular, the
doctrine surrounding partition disputes among co-tenants is illustrative.
Partition in kind -in which the court actually divides the parcel into multiple
pieces-is the default, but partition by sale, whereby the court orders that the
whole parcel be sold and revenue divided among the disputing owners, may be
used instead if dividing the parcel up would significantly impact its total
value. 9 The rule stated in Shields v. McConville is typical of most jurisdictions:
infra note 28. Certain states also require that the adverse possession be done in good faith-
or, more rarely, bad faith. See supra note 17.
27. See, e.g., Kroulik v. Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Colo. App. 1981) (awarding original
owner damages "measured by the diminution in the market value of the real property" for
activities carried out by the attempted adverse possessors); Bowlander v. Mapes, No. OT-
o8-033, 2009 WL 354477, 23 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2009) (declining to award damages
to the original property owner for the actions of the attempted adverse possessor since they
"failed to demonstrate ... specific property value depreciation"); Scott v. Elliott, 451 P.2d
474, 48o (Or. 1969) (awarding original owner damages of "the fair rental value of the
property" for the time the land was occupied by the attempted adverse possessor).
28. See, e.g., Hill v. Cape Coral Bank, 402 So. 2d 945, 946 (Ala. 1981) ("[Tlhey had made
permanent improvements upon the property, the value of which greatly exceeded the value
of the use and occupation of the land, and even of the land itself"); Rodgers v. Pahoundis,
897 N.E.2d 68o, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (noting that the adverse possessor's changes to
the disputed property "were either detrimental... [or] added little value to the property");
Catlett v. Whaley, 731 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that, aside from the
improvements made by the adverse possessor, the "tract was landlocked and of little
apparent value").
zg. Zachary D. Kuperman, Note, Cutting the Bary in Half, 77 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 268-69 (2011)
("[S]tatutes in almost every jurisdiction... favor partition in kind, and allow sale only if
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Whether partition in kind will result in great prejudice . . . requires
comparing two amounts. The first is the amount an owner would
receive if the property were divided in kind and the owner then sold his
portion of the property. The second is the amount each owner would
receive if the entire property were sold and the proceeds were divided
among the owners. If the first amount is materially less than the second
amount, great prejudice has been shown.3"
Courts' comparative reluctance to consider these same diminutions in property
value in adverse possession cases is striking. Given that courts are both able
and willing to consider this value change in other areas of property law, folding
irregularity concerns into the improvement requirement would not require any
additional expertise.
On the other hand, taking into account the systemic costs associated with
boundary irregularity- increased property disputes and transaction costs-
probably should not be left up to the courts. Whether the gains to efficiency
achieved through protecting reliance interests from ancient claims or title
defects are actually outweighed by the litigation costs associated with adverse
possession itself or the costs of searching for title beyond what is recorded is a
broad policy consideration. While courts are competent to undertake the case-
by-case inquiry of whether redrawing the boundary lines in a certain way
would reduce the value of one particular parcel of land, legislatures- with the
benefit of committee specialization, fact-finding commissions, and expert
testimony-are generally better positioned to make such larger systemic
physical partition would result in 'great prejudice' or 'manifest injury' to a party in
interest.").
30. 820 N.W.2d 868, 877 (Neb. 2012); see also Butte Creek Island Ranch v. Crim, 136 Cal. App.
3d 360, 367 (1982) ("[E]vidence which supports a partition sale rather than physical division
is economic evidence to the effect that, due to the particular situation of the land, the
division of the land would substantially diminish the value of each party's interest.");
Schnell v. Schnell, 346 N.W.2d 713, 716 (N.D. 1984) (noting that partition in kind is
preferred to partition by sale unless "'the value of the share of each in case of a partition
would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that could probably be
obtained from the whole'") (quoting Berg v. Kremers, 181 N.W.2d 730, 733 (N.D. 1970));
Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977) ("The established test of whether a partition in
kind would result in great prejudice to the owners is 'whether the value of the share of each
in case of a partition would be materially less than his share of the money equivalent that
could probably be obtained for the whole.'") (quoting Haggerty v. Nobles, 419 P.2d 9, 12
(Or. 1966)); Cecola v. Ruley, 12 S.W. 3d 848, 85 (Tex. App. 2000) ("If the property can be
divided in kind without materially impairing its value, a sale will not be ordered, but when
dividing the land into parcels causes its value to be substantially less than its value when
whole, the rights of the owners are substantially prejudiced.").
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analyses." Since many states define adverse possession by statute, legislatures
would also be better positioned to implement any such change. This two-
pronged approach -whereby courts consider the case-by-case effects of
irregularity and legislatures consider the effects of regularity writ large-
provides a more prudent allocation of responsibility.
IV. TOPOGRAPHICAL VARIANCE AND TRENDS IN ADVERSE
POSSESSION
The effects of boundary irregularity on property values and transaction
costs described in Part II do not apply with equal force across all topographies.
For example, Libecap and Lueck explicitly note that where terrain is highly
variable, in such a way that it changes across even small plots, the costs of
rigidity associated with maintaining a straight-line property grid are much
greater and hence more likely to outweigh the benefits of regularity.' In their
study, the gains of maintaining regular property boundaries clearly exceeded
the costs of rigidity, even in the short run, but their study involved a fair
amount of flat, featureless terrain.33 States with terrain that varies significantly
across plots might be better off not incorporating concerns with boundary
regularity into their adverse possession doctrines, or constructing statutes
sufficiently open-ended for judges to determine parcel-by-parcel when
regularity might be salient. But for flat, featureless states with little variation
between plots, the absence of such considerations is more striking and
potentially costly.
While some of the effects outlined in Part II are not equally robust across
all geographies, many of the long-term costs of irregular boundaries - difficulty
in adapting land to new uses, higher costs for developing infrastructure - apply
to all types of terrain. These costs are not necessarily incorporated into the
bottom line of the analysis done by Libecap and Lueck, who focus exclusively
on comparing market values, transaction frequencies, and the number of
property disputes. Hence, even in highly complex and varied terrain, one could
expect long-term effects of boundary irregularity to manifest themselves as
different "[p]opulation densities, land use[s], and . . . long-term economic
growth."'
31. For a full analysis of the comparative competencies of courts and legislatures in such
inquiries, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (4 th ed. 2007).
32. See Libecap & Lueck, supra note 13, at 449.
33. Id. at 434-35.
34. Id. at 428.
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Furthermore, while no state expressly takes into account concerns about
boundary regularity, the effects of boundary regularity may be used in future
research to help explain some existing features of adverse possession statutes.
For example, one study has found that high population densities correlate with
longer statutes of limitations for adverse possession." Where population is
highly concentrated, the number of land owners per square mile is also likely to
be high, such that there may be a higher risk that land will be continuously
chopped up into small, irregular bits by adverse possession suits over time.
Longer statutes of limitations make it less likely that any of these suits will be
successful. Additionally, there is a much greater variation among the statutes of
limitations for adverse possession than among statutes of limitations for most
personal actions. 6 This variation in statutory periods may track the variable
costs of boundary irregularity across different states' topographies.
Recognizing the effects of adverse possession on boundary irregularity may
open the door to a greater understanding of how contemporary variation in
adverse possession statutes came to pass, and how the doctrine could evolve in
the future to increase its efficient application.
CONCLUSION
Successful adverse possession claims, through the application of actual
possession requirements, can lead to both parcel-by-parcel and aggregate
changes in boundary irregularity. Increases in boundary irregularity can in turn
diminish land value, increase transaction costs, and lead to long-term economic
distortions. However, the statutes and case law surrounding adverse
possession reflect either a lack of awareness or an unwillingness to take such
factors into consideration. Moving forward, boundary regularity
considerations may be incorporated into adverse possession doctrine without
great difficulty, thereby increasing the efficiency of adverse possession.
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